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Box I additional suggestions from the Chair - Statement by Stop Killer Robots to the GGE on LAWS

Read the Stop Killer Robots statement to the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS) on Box I additional suggestions from the Chair.

The following statement was delivered on Thursday, 5 March 2026, by Isabelle Jones to delegates participating in the meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS), which took place on 2-6 March 2026.

Thank you Chair.

We appreciate the continued efforts of you and your team and of states to reach consensus on the characterisation.

On paragraph 1A, we believe the first sentence provides some clarification in response to the addition of the term ‘identify’. We welcome this development.

However, this sentence could be improved further by ensuring that it captures not only the general characteristics of targets, but also situations where operators may compile lists of potential targets.

Chair, one of the central concerns with autonomous weapons systems that we are addressing in these discussions are the risks introduced by the uncertainty and distance from legal and ethical decision-making that arise when it is sensors rather than people that determine exactly when, where, and what weapons systems strike. These risks include unintended objects being selected and engaged by a system, or unintended harm being caused if the context of use changes after decisions by a human operator.

We imagine that the intention of states with the second sentence of paragraph 1A is to exclude from the characterisation weapons systems where there is no uncertainty as to what a system will strike (that may for example have an automatic guidance system).

However, we believe that this sentence risks having the opposite effect to achieving this narrow exclusion.

For Stop Killer Robots, it introduces more ambiguity, and the potential for the characterisation to be read much more narrowly than we believe is the intention here. It is not clear what ‘choosing the specific target(s)’ means. This language could risk implying that autonomous weapons systems are only those that are sent out on the battlefield to seek targets entirely speculatively – a practice we assume that states are not seeking to employ – rather than in response, for example, to the known presence of military targets in a certain area. This language could risk excluding systems that states in this room have widely accepted are within the scope of these discussions, such as missile defence systems that were mentioned by the US delegation earlier this week: these can be activated in response to known incoming munitions.

We are sure this is not the intention of including this language.

Our recommendation is that the second sentence of paragraph 1A be deleted. We believe it is not needed in order to address certain countries’ stated concerns. These should be well covered by the inclusion of the term ‘identify’ in paragraph 1 and its qualification through the first sentence of paragraph 1A. The second sentence risks introducing loopholes and narrow interpretations that the first sentence intends to prevent. It is not easy to see how it could be clarified to avoid this, and so deletion would be preferable – though we appreciate colleagues’ continued efforts to find improvements for its clarification, and note the Chair’s comments on the intention to retain this sentence.

We note that states are not yet at the stage of negotiating a legally binding instrument and therefore a definition of autonomous weapons systems. And, paragraph 1C of the rolling text notes the possibility to discuss exclusions in the future. We remind states that they should resolve definitional issues during negotiations.

We would like to emphasize again to states the considerable progress that they have made and the convergence they have achieved, to get to the point of a text of elements that can work as a basis for the negotiation of an instrument. As various delegations have reminded us this week, the purpose and function of the CCW is the progressive development of the rules of international law. Negotiations on a legally binding instrument are where outstanding issues should ultimately be addressed.

Thank you Chair.

Stop Killer Robots