Will states take the next step in 2026?

At the 2025 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties (MHCP) of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 12 November, four more states – Angola, Hungary, Mozambique, and Nigeria – joined a group now totalling 46 countries that have stated they believe the text on the table at the CCW gives a sufficient basis to negotiate an instrument on autonomous weapons systems; that they are ready to move forward towards negotiations; and that others should support this goal.

The range of countries making this joint statement – first at the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on autonomous weapons in September, and then as a working paper tabled by Brazil to the Meeting of the High Contracting Parties – includes both states that have declared a military interest in autonomous weapons systems, and countries that could be most adversely affected by these systems’ further development and use. It is encouraging and significant to the impact of a future treaty that states with varying interests in this issue can find common ground on the need to move forward on regulation.  Now, more States need to express their support for moving to negotiations – and to act on this by starting them in 2026. 

States could choose to launch negotiations on an instrument at the 2026 CCW Review Conference. However, in addition to longstanding issues the CCW faces in reaching consensus to take bold action on humanitarian harm in armed conflict, it has also been facing concerted efforts to undermine its work. If states hold the goal of launching negotiations on an instrument on autonomous weapons systems, they must focus on how this can be achieved, notwithstanding these challenges.

The CCW remains an important part of international law when it comes to the protection of both soldiers and civilians in war – and recent deliberate attempts to erode its proper functioning are both extremely troubling and must be strongly opposed. This year, the CCW’s annual MHCP ended up as a half hour of administrative decisions, after states parties struggled to find a country willing to Chair the meeting, and decided not to run a full three-day agenda on issues under its purview. How this came about can be seen as part of an effort to progressively undermine the functioning of the CCW in recent years – and in the context of wider efforts to undermine international law and multilateralism. It is the responsibility of all of us with a stake in international humanitarian norms and values to resist such steps.

With positive progress and a growing recognition that there is a sufficient basis and common ground to start negotiations on an instrument on autonomous weapons systems, it is essential that states show the courage and political will needed in 2026 to make this move. The goal of achieving a legally binding instrument that rejects the automation of killing and keeps meaningful human control over the use of force is ultimately more important than the forum in which negotiations are mandated. The text on the table at the CCW and states’ support for it shows that achieving meaningful regulation is now possible, and within reach: they are in a good position. Next year states must therefore consider all their options for continuing their work by starting negotiations – and not let the progress they have made so far be wasted.